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Book review of Marco Bertilorenzi, The international aluminium cartel, 1886-
1978. The business and politics of a cooperative industrial institution (Abingdon-
New York, 2016) 
by Valerio Cerretano, University of Glasgow 
 
This is an important piece of historical work for at least three reasons. First and 
foremost, it offers a unique insight into the history of the aluminium trade; 
secondly, it adds to our understanding of international cartels and European 
cartelisation; last but not least, while having a thorough global perspective, it 
relies on an uncommonly wide range of archival sources that are scattered over a 
large number of public as well as private company archives predominantly 
located in Europe.  International cartels (namely, price, market-sharing or sales 
as well as output restricting agreements among firms based in different 
countries) represented a common form of international business until the 1940s. 
Moreover, these were essentially European. As a proxy for their reach and 
power, we could mention that European cartels came to control about 40 
percent of global trade in 1938 according to the League of Nations. No surprise, 
then, that they have attracted a great deal of attention from historians, 
economists and policy-makers. An important strand of the literature has focused 
mainly on the anticompetitive nature of cartels, whether domestic or 
international. The main hypotheses are that they kept prices above competition 
levels (and conversely, they restricted output and sales below those levels) and 
that they were short-lived as participating firms tended to cheat what in essence 
were not legally enforceable agreements. Another strand has by contrast sought 
to redirect attention to the impact of European cartels on economic and 
corporate development (Fear, 2008).  The book by Bertilorenzi makes a 
significant contribution to this latter and perhaps more fruitful approach to the 
study of international cartelisation. It confirms that international cartels 
constituted a distinguishing feature in European industrialisation, influencing 
foreign investment, corporate strategy, innovation and the spread of industry 
beyond national boundaries.  
While covering an uncommonly long period, i.e. from the 1880s to the 
1970s, the book attempts a detailed analysis of the interplay between the leading 
players into the industry; the inner, complex workings of cartel arrangements 
that these firms set up from about the 1900s; and how external factors, i.e. the 
financial instability of the period immediately after the First Word War or the 
spread of an antitrust legislation after the Second World War, contributed to 
shape cartel arrangements in the aluminium trade. The book is an implicit 
confirmation of Fear’s poignant observation that European cartels did not 
‘abolish competition but regulate[d] it’ and that ‘historically, cartels provided 
participating firms a range of market-ordering options that the antitrust has 
since foreclosed’ (Fear,  2008, 269, 281-7). The book brings new evidence, to 
paraphrase once more Fear, against the hypothesis of a ‘stark dichotomy of 
markets (cartels as distortions) or hierarchies (cartels as incomplete, inefficient 
internalization)’ and against ‘one of the largest misconceptions about cartels that 
they halt[ed] competition and innovation’ (Fear, 2008, 269).They rather 
‘reshape[d] the rules of the game on which competition rest [ed]’ (Fear, 2008, 
269) 
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In the introduction, Bertilorenzi seems to suggest that international 
cartels in the aluminium industry secured price stability until the 1970s. 
Throughout the book there are similar statements about the alleged stability of 
aluminium cartels. Yet Bertilorenzi does not spend much energy trying to 
demonstrate this hypothesis. The book also seems uncritically to echo a popular 
business philosophy of the 1920s whereby most problems of industry were to be 
found less in a lack of demand than in an excess of production and whereby 
cartels were instrumental in the ‘rationalisation’ of industry, an ambiguous term 
broadly referring to the need to increase efficiency (via industrial concentration) 
and bring output in line with demand (Hannah, 1979, 29). 
Important as it may appear, this lack of attention should not be 
overemphasised. For one thing, this is primarily a book about cartel politics and 
cartel formation. To an extent, this account seems to reflect the undergoing shift 
of research attention towards the impact of European and international cartels 
on the development of the European corporate economy. Whether European 
cartels were stable and whether they succeeded in stabilising or increasing 
prices is beyond the point. Bertilorenzi shows that what matters is that they 
contributed to shape the strategy of individual firms and the evolution of this 
trade in global markets.  
Those with a fixation with cartel stability and cartel duration (as well as 
their anticompetitive behaviour) will however have more than one motive to 
find this book very interesting. The reason for this is that it also is a work about 
the attempts that the main actors into the aluminium industry made to turn 
price- fixing arrangements into sales and output agreements through ad hoc 
international organisations. This is an important point when considering that 
scholars and practitioners alike since the 1930s have often argued that sale 
organisations could make cartels more stable by reducing the incentives to cheat. 
Bertilorenzi seems at times to lose sight of the fact that international cartel 
agreements were not legally enforceable and, second, that these and similar 
arrangements depended much on the workings of, and interactions between, 
national cartels (which became legally enforceable in the 1930s in most 
European countries). It should be taken with a pinch of salt but one conclusion to 
which this monograph seems to point is that, until the late 1930s, the leading 
aluminium firms produced different products which were hardly comparable 
and which had differing price elasticity in global markets, thus complicating the 
definition and allocation of sales and output quotas.  Another inference is that 
the creation of trade associations in this business was instrumental in the 
pursuit of standardisation (namely, the reduction of the number of products and 
the use of common standards and measures). This seemed to remain an 
important aim of cartelisation and other global governance mechanisms put in 
place in this industry especially after the First World War.  
This brings us to the technological dimension of the aluminium cartel. 
Although inevitably a tangential preoccupation in a book about cartel politics, 
the technological evolution of aluminium is perhaps carried out unsystematically 
here. It would have been germane to deal with this specific theme in one or two 
chapters. For example, we do not know why two technologists sought to develop 
the mass production of aluminium almost at the same time in the early 1880s. 
Was there any specific new set of knowledge or discovery in physics and in 
chemistry at work behind the early development of this trade? Were the 
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founders of this industry looking for new alloys? Was this trade an outgrowth of 
the electricity generation industry or rather of the metallurgic industry? What 
was the role of the armament industry in the early development of this trade?  
These and similar questions remain unanswered here. Likewise, the evolution of 
the end-uses of aluminium over a century is barely treated here. Yet this remains 
a crucial topic in relation to the evolution of cartels and particularly in relation to 
the ways in which governments interfered with their workings after 1945. 
Many statements are not backed with referenced footnotes and need in 
some cases additional elaboration. The book reads well but makes an excessive 
use of acronyms, which, along with the occasional use of non-idiomatic English 
and occasional lapses in the style, tends to make some confusion in the reader’s 
mind. The structure could have been tighter and more coherent by reducing the 
number of chapters, eliminating the large number of subchapters and probably 
shortening the whole work.  Despite these limitations, this is a good and very 
articulate read. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this work for this field 
of studies. It is destined to become a building block in the literature on European 
and international cartels for its uncommonly large use of archival material, the 
uncommonly long time-period under consideration, and last but not least for its 
unique global perspective.  
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